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Superpower Ethics:
A Third World Perspective
Ali A. Mazrui
F rom an ethical point of view, one of the most disturbing thingsabout the superpowers is that there are only two of them for thetime being. Their physical duality has fed on the theme of ethical
dualism. After all, in political affairs, the number two lends itself to the
notion of opposites and to the condition of dichotomy. It lends itself to the
obstinacy of believer against unbeliever, Jew against Gentile, slave against
freeperson, and friend against foe. Out of dualism has emerged the whole
moral paradigm of evil at war with good. The two superpowers are caught
up in that history of dualism, and it is in the face of this dualism that the
Third World must deal with them.
Ideological preferences are of course part and parcel of superpower
ethics: Socialism is supposed to be a redistribution of economic power in
favor of the dispossessed; liberalism is a redistribution of political power
in favor of the marginalized. The United States is a liberal polity
domestically, but at the global level does American policy pursue the
redistribution of political power in favor of marginalized nations? The
Soviet Union is a socialist system, but at the global level does Soviet policy
work for the redistribution of economic power in favor of the dispos-
sessed nations? Although the Soviet Union subscribes to the doctrine of
economic determinism, its impact on economic change in the Third
World is negligible. Although doctrinally liberal, the impact of the United
States on the liberation of the Third World is worse than negligible, it is
negative. There are solid reasons for these doctrinal contradictions. Let us
examine them more closely.
10 ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1987 Volume 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , I . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ..O
The Superpower-s and Economic Redistribution
Even in the postcolonial era, the Soviet Union and its socialist allies have
played a much smaller role in the economic development of, for instance,
Africa than has the West. There are a number of reasons why the
capitalist world has been more relevant economically for Africa and other
developing areas than the Soviet bloc.
First, the global economic system is dominated by international
capitalism. The rules of international exchange are derived from capital-
ism, including a strong leaning toward the principles of supply and
demand and of the autonomy of market forces. The major international
currencies of exchange are Western currencies—the pivot of which is the
American dollar. The international conventions of economic behavior are
part of the Western lexicon, including the rules of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The major commercial banks are, by
definition, capitalist, casting out chains of indebtedness to one Third
World country after another. The major development banks are also
Western-dominated—at the pinnacle are the World Bank, traditionally
under an American president, and the International Monetary Fund,
traditionally under a Western European director-general. Although in
confrontations with the IMF, Third World countries have sometimes
resisted the Fund’s conditionality, in the end the majority have capitu-
lated.1
The markets for Third World products are primarily in the West.
African countries in particular have ignored the opportunities for trade
with their immediate neighbors because of the colonial structure of their
externally oriented economies. This in turn, has perpetuated the North-
South and South-North flows of trade.
Then there is the whole dialectic of global production. While the
genius of socialism may indeed be distribution, it is capitalism that has
demonstrated a genius for production. No system in human history has
shown a greater capacity for economic expansion than capitalism. One
result has been that the West produces far more of what the Third World
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1See, for example, Peter Blackburn, “Nigeria: The Year of the IMF,” Africa Report 31:6
(November/December 1986) 18-20; Ralph I. Onwuka and Olajide Aluko, The Future of Afi-ica and
the New International Economic Order (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986); and Robert E. Wood,
“The Debt Crisis in North-South Relations,” Third World Quarterly 6:3 (July 1984) 703–16. See also
Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap: The International Moneta~ Fund and the Third World (New York:
Monthly Review, 1974).
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“needs” than does the Soviet bloc. And the quality of Western products is
usually superior to comparably priced products from the East. Civilian
technology tends to be more sophisticated in the West, and Western mass
production and unit-cost efficiency ensures more competitive prices in
commercial sales to the Third World.
Also relevant to the the West’s impact on Third World development
is the role of foreign aid and international charity. Generally, there are
four major reasons for extending foreign aid: charity, solidarity, co-op-
tation, and self-interest. The West operates on all four, depending upon
the particular case. Charity has often been capitalism’s classical answer to
problems of maldistribution. Within the Western world itself charity has
sometimes served as capitalism’s gesture of penance to the Christian
conscience. In more pragmatic terms, charity has historically been used to
diffuse not only the suffering of the poor but also their anger. Within the
class structure of a capitalist society, charity has been part of a strategy of
co-opting lower classes and of consolidating allegiances. Charity makes
the poor more loyal while their leaders respond to the lure of upward
social mobility. In general, the Scandinavian countries and the Nether-
lands score high on giving aid for reasons of pure charity, as do the many
private humanitarian groups from the Christian world in general.
The Soviet bloc has no comparable private effort in aid and human-
itarianism.z For one thing, official Soviet atheism has eliminated the
missionary church organizations which might have operated in the Third
World. It must not be forgotten that the focus of Western missionary
work has shifted from saving souls for the hereafter to saving lives in the
here and now; there has been a shift from a focus on salvation to an
emphasis on service. The Soviet system also lacks private secular charities,
such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, and crisis- and relief-
oriented organizations, such as Oxfam. Neither is the Soviet tax system
geared toward providing tax incentives for those who want to be chari-
table. Indeed, the system does not even acknowledge that it has million-
aires of its own.
There is also the Soviet Union’s posture that underdevelopment in
the Third World was caused by Western imperialism—and has to be
corrected by Western compensation. It is in fact true that most of the flaws
of the African economies are due directly to the legacy of Western
imperialism. These flaws include such economic distortions as undue
emphasis on cash crops, a leaning toward monoculturalism, the North-
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2 For a discussion of American development aid via, say, the Peace Corps program, which
has no real Soviet equivalent, see Coates Redmon, Come as You Are: The Peace Cor@ Sto~ (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986).
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South orientation of trade, the urban bias in development, and the elite
bias in priorities. African problems with the balance of payments, the
balance of trade, unstable export earnings, and the accumulation of debt
are substantially derived from those underlying colonial causes.s The
Soviet Union feels that it is not up to the socialist countries to bail out the
West from facing its postcolonial responsibilities in these areas. Nonethe-
less, even if they had the will the socialist countries do not have the capacity
to amend the international system in favor of the dispossessed. The West
is in charge of the global economy. The Soviet Union does not have the
equivalent of the Western world’s private investments in developing
countries, and by definition, the Soviet system has no multinational
corporations to balance out the activities of Western entrepreneurs. The
whole area of Western private initiative in the Third World has no
mirror-image in the Soviet experience.
Finally, there is the persistent Soviet belief that conditions of under-
development are fertile ground for a social revolution. Karl Marx himself
argued that it was development, not underdevelopment, that created a
revolutionary situation. This thesis led Marx to expect the first socialist
revolutions to occur in the advanced capitalist countries of his era such as
England and France. But Soviet policymakers today know better—partly
from the experience of their own revolution of 1917, but also from the
history of their attempts to recruit countries to the ranks of the socialist
community. Contrary to Marx, it has been the weakest links of the
capitalist chain that have been prone to breaking. While Marx thought
development came before revolution in each epoch, Soviet policymakers
in the twentieth century have been tempted to reverse the order and
consider revolution as the mother of development rather than its
offspring.
In light of these ideological calculations, the Soviet Union can be
forgiven for regarding underdevelopment in the Third World as at best
a mixed curse. If underdevelopment is a potential breeding ground for
revolution, Soviet intervention for pursuit of development may turn out
to be a thrust against revolution. Therefore, although socialism is ulti-
mately an ethic of distribution, the USSR does not practice that ethic in its
relations with the Third World.
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3See M .S. Wionczek, Some Key Issues for the World Peripheq: Selected Essays (Oxford:
Pergamon, 1982); T.G. Weiss and A. Jennings, Morefor the Lead Prospects for Poorest Countries in the
Eighties (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983); S.K. Chauhan, Who Puts Water in the Taps?
Community Participation in the Third World Drinking Water, Sanitation and Health (London: Earthscan,
1983); and E. Chuta and S.V. Setheraman, eds., Rural Small-Scale Industries and Em@oyment in Afn”ca
and Asia: A Review of Programmed and Policies (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1984).
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The Superpowers and Liberation
While socialism is an ethic of economic distribution, liberalism is an ethic
of the redistribution of political power in favor of the marginalized. The
United States is doctrinally liberal. Let us now examine why the United
States, though a child of revolution in the eighteenth century, has become
the father of imperialism in the late twentieth.
In a sense, the same reason explains why America was once revolu-
tionary and has now become imperialist. The Founding Fathers of the
U.S. distrusted concentrated political power, and because of their distrust
they ensured decentralization at home. They worked out a system of
checks and balances, a doctrine of separation of political powers, a
principle of separation of church from state, an economic ideology
insulating government from the economy, and a constitutional apparatus
of federalism which divides authority between the local and the national
levels.
But the same spirit that led America to distrust concentrated power
domestically led America to acquire such power internationally. The
system of political decentralization allowed capitalism to flourish. The
subsequent concentration of economic power made the United States
exploitative of other societies abroad. The more recent concentration of
military power made America overly sensitive to strategic calculations,
sometimes at the expense of the independence and territory of small
countries. An example of such oversensitivity was the American military
involvement in Vietnam. This strategic miscalculation cost fifty thousand
American lives and more than a million and a half Vietnamese lives.
Unlike the Congress, recent American administrations have refused to
learn the full lessons of the catastrophe of Vietnam. President Reagan’s
latest strategic experiment in Central America is another case of abuse of
military might. Fortunately, the constitutional checks and balances of the
Founding Fathers have helped to restrain—at least for the time being—
the intervention by Uncle Sam in Central America.
The recent exercises in Central America are just the latest chapter in
the history of the growth of the United States into an imperialist power,
which began with the expansion of the domestic base itself. To the extent
that growth of the United States into a superpower began domestically,
this history has a lot in common with the history of the growth of the
Soviet Union into the same rank. Both countries needed to expand
territorially before they could acquire superpower status; both were well
served by the territorial ambitions in their respective histories. Any
discussion of superpower ethics must include a discussion of the sheer size
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not superpower status in the
The &ars accomplished most of Russia’s territorial expansion before
the October Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, conquering one principality
after another across two continents. By the time of the revolution, Russian
sovereignty extended across a territory larger than any since the Roman
Empire. The Soviet Union’s expansionist thrust has since added to that
territorial vastness. The Soviet Union has absorbed the Baltic States and
the territorial acquisitions of World War II into its body politic.
The territorial expansion of the United States reveals a similar sense
of “Manifest Destiny.” Sometimes U.S. expansion was the result of
“buying” territory, which of course included its inhabitants without their
consent—the purchase of Louisiana from France and Alaska from Russia
were not simply transactions in real estate, they were also purchases of
people without regard for their preferences. Then there was the war with
Mexico, one of the earliest U.S. confrontations with postcolonial Latin
America. Again American territorial appetite and imperial self-aggran-
dizement sought new levels of satisfaction. Areas like California and New
Mexico were forever absorbed into the United States. A Trojan-horse
strategy of annexation served the U.S. well in acquiring Texas, which was
destined to become one of the richest states of the American union.
In addition to its expansionist period, the United States also had a
relatively modest role as a colonialist power, in the sense of ruling other
societies without incorporating them into the metropolitan body politic.
American rule in the Philippines was in a sense the most important of the
colonialist experiments. The U.S. still plays a residual role of this kind in
Puerto Rico, the American Virgin Islands, and in a number of other
oceanic “territories” and “possessions” currently under the American flag.
It was not until after World War 11that the United States entered the
stage of global imperialism— America as a global sheriff. America, the
incarnation of liberal decentralization of power at the domestic level,
became the incarnation of the most concentrated international power in
history. The United States embodied power greater by far than the
strength of Rome at its most glorious, greater than the leverage of
England at its most imperial. The American Founding Fathers must have
turned in their graves as they witnessed their child grow into a dangerous,
mighty adult. Together they might now jointly reaffirm the observation of
Lord Acton that power does corrupt, and absolute power is in danger of
corrupting absolutely. The United States has lost the credentials of
revolution and acquired the fangs of imperialism.
But if power has corrupted the United States, has it also corru~ted
the Soviet Union? If the Unhed States is a bad influence on Third W~rld
liberation, why is not the Soviet Union a similarly adverse influence on
Superpower Ethics: A Third World Perspective 15
developing countries? Needless to say, the Soviet Union has also been
corrupted by power. But in this case, it is not the Third World that is
primarily paying the price: The Soviet Union serves as an imperialist
power in Europe, is a liberating force in Africa and Latin America, and
has a mixed record in Asia.
The USSR has been heir to both the tsarist and the Nazi empires in
Europe. What the tsars incorporated into the Russian empire, the
Communists retained; what the Nazis subjugated in World War II, the
Russian liberators subjugated under Communist rule. In this sense the
Soviet Union is an imperialist power in Europe.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union has been a liberating force in
Africa and Latin America. Southern Africa, in particular, has been a
major beneficiary of the military help of Communist countries, and
without that help the liberation of Southern Africa—from the Portuguese
Empire to Rhodesia—would have been delayed by at least a generation.
The Communist world has given Southern African liberation fighters
hardware ranging from the sten gun to surface-to-air missiles. There
seems little doubt that the emancipation of Namibia and the Republic of
South Africa will also have to rely disproportionately on the military
favors of the Communist world (which already include the unique role of
Cuban troops in consolidating liberated areas such as Angola).
As for the Soviet role in the liberation of Latin America, the Cuban
model is of course a special case. Ideally Cuba should have been the
Western Hemisphere’s Yugoslavia— a nation which successfully escapes
the grips of the regional superpower without having to sell too much of its
sovereignty to the opposite camp. Perhaps Cuba is indeed another
Yugoslavia, but Fidel Castro has been forced by the United States to be
more dependent on the Soviet Union than he would have preferred. In
recompense, Cuba is more of a revolutionary catalyst in the Western
Hemisphere than Yugoslavia has proved to be a catalyst of dissent in the
Soviet bloc. To that extent, Cuba has been a greater force for the
liberation of Latin America from the United States than Yugoslavia has
been for the liberation of Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union.
The latest confrontations with American imperialism have of course
been in Central America, especially in Nicaragua, where pro-Cuban
forces are in power, and in El Salvador, where pro-Cuban forces are in
rebellion against a pro-American regime. Recent examples of similar
struggles against pro-Cuban forces in power are Grenada under Maurice
Bishop and Jamaica under Michael Manley. Behind all of these confron-
tations lies the basic superpower rivalry. On balance, therefore, the Soviet
Union has been as liberating a force in Latin America as it has been in
Africa, although the manifestations of the struggle have been radically
different.
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It is in Asia that the Soviet role is at its most ambiguous—neither
decidedly imperialist, as it is in Europe, nor convincingly liberating, as it
has been in Africa and Latin America. Soviet hardware support for
Vietnam helped Hanoi defeat the United States and its allies in the
struggle to control South Vietnam. The Soviet factor has continued to be
a major pillar of independence for a unified Vietnam in the face of a
basically hostile international environment. On the other hand, Soviet
support for Hanoi has indirectly subsidized Vietnam’s occupation of
Cambodia, a negation of the latter’s independence. But, without doubt,
the most imperialist Soviet action in Asia in the last quarter of the
twentieth century has been the 1979 invasion and continuing occupation
of Afghanistan—a superpower violating the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of one of its less powerful neighbors.
The Soviet Union has, on the whole, been an ally of decolonization of
the Third World, in spite of the glaring exception of Afghanistan. The
Soviet role as a champion of decolonization has been aided by several
factors. First, in much of Asia and Africa imperialism arrived with
Western capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While in
reality capitalist imperialism is only one form of foreign domination, it has
been the most pervasive form of alien exploitation that the people of Asia
and Africa have experienced. Therefore, Third World resentment of
imperialism has generally spilled over into a resentment of capitalism.
Because of the link between Western private enterprise and Western
colonization, a link between nationalism and socialism has evolved in the
Third World. Since socialism is the enemy of capitalism and nationalism
the adversary of imperialism and given that capitalism and imperialism
were linked in the first instance, it stands to reason that nationalism and
socialism should in turn become allies.
Second, the standing of the Soviet Union in the Third World—and
the appropriateness of Soviet policy—has gained from Lenin’s impact on
ideology and political theorizing in the developing regions, ranging from
Kwame Nkrumah’s book, Neo-Coloniali.sm: The ~a.stStage of Imperzali.sm,4to
Latin American theories of dependencza. ln other words, the Third World’s
favorable ideological predisposition toward the Soviet Union was greatly
aided by the prior popularity of some aspects of Leninist thought.
Third, the Soviets’ motivation for supporting Third World liberation
has been strengthened by their apparent grand design to make significant
inroads into the lives and politics of postcolonial societies. Supporting
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Coloniahk-m: The Last Stage of Impen”altim (London: H einemann,
1968).
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decolonization in Western-dominated areas is seen as one way of winning
friends and influencing people in the postcolonial era.
Finally, the Soviet need for foreign exchange has been another
powerful motive for Soviet sales of armaments to Third World liberation
movements and to postcolonial leftist governments. Pure military aid
from the Soviet Union is, from all appearances, more the exception than
the rule. Southern African liberation movements have often had to raise
funds (often from private sympathizers in the West) in order to be able to
buy military hardware from the Soviet Union and other socialist coun-
tries. Some arms have been supplied on credit by the Soviets, but on
balance ideological solidarity has not had to clash with commercial
self-interest from a Soviet perspective.
The fact that the Soviet Union has been aided in decolonization by
these others factors need not mean that the Soviet Union is hypocritical.
Even among hardened Soviet policymakers there may remain a sincere
conviction that, ultimately, human destiny lies in the hands of the
dispossessed—and the masses of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the
majority of the world’s dispossessed. Soviet support for Third World
causes cannot but be affected by that wider ethical concern. Yet the
contradiction persists. The socialist superpower is the champion of the
liberal cause of freedom and self-determination with minimum partici-
pation in the more socialist mission of global economic redistribution. In
global politics the United States has been more of an economic determin-
ist than the USSR, while the Soviet Union has been more of a liberator
than the United States.
We have so far focused on political liberation and economic redistri-
bution as two competing ethical themes between the Third World and the
superpowers. But what about the ethics of military security? It is to this
third area of moral concern that we now turn.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
The Superpowers and the Ethics of Violence
Both superpowers regard Third World states as fair markets for the sale
of conventional armaments, subject to wider political allegiances. The
U.S. sales are more subject to domestic restraints than Soviet sales. For
example, the pro-Israel lobby in Washington has considerable say as to
what arms are sold to which Middle East governments. But while
American arms are more subject to private political lobbies at home,
Soviet arms are more available to private political movements abroad.
Certainly, as discussed earlier, the liberation of Southern Africa would
have been delayed by at least a generation if Soviet arms were not
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available for sale to such movements as the Zimbabwe African National
Liberation Army (ZANLA) in colonial Rhodesia and the Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in colonial Angola.
Yet both superpowers are particularly hypocritical in the field of
militarism and the ethics of political violence. And within this military
domain two areas are particularly subject to moral double standards—
terrorism and nuclear weapons, which we will take up in turn.
The first factor to note about terrorism is that it isjust another form
of warfare—no worse than conventional or nuclear war and considerably
less destructive in scale. Some may argue that terrorism leaves civilians
particularly vulnerable, but that is a peculiarity of virtually all forms of
warfare in the twentieth century. No one on the side of the Allies worried
about how many German civilians were killed in Dresden or Berlin as the
two cities were pulverized in the closing stages of World War II. As
Thomas C. Schelling has pointed out, “in the Second World War
noncombatants were deliberately chosen as targets by both Axis and
Allied Forces.”5 Harry Truman did not lose much sleep about Japanese
civilians when he ordered that atomic bombs be dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. And what sane government genuinely worries about
civilian casualties and at the same time arms itself for a nuclear confron-
tation, as the United States and the Soviet Union are constantly doing?
Civilian casualties ceased to be a major worry of twentieth-century
warfare decades ago. It is an anachronism to proclaim the concern only in
the case of terrorism, which in this era kills far fewer civilians than
conventional warfare. As compared with plans for a nuclear catastrophe,
terrorist casualties are less than a drop in an ocean of blood.
Non–state-supported terrorism is normally the warfare of the weak.
The flip side of Lord Acton’s coinage is that powerlessness, too, corrupts,
and absolute powerlessness can corrupt absolutely. After all, who took the
Palestinians seriously before they became a terrorist nuisance? Not even
their fellow Arabs treated them as much more than refugees. It took their
own call to arms to make them a constant item on the world’s agenda.
“Lest we forget; lest we forget!”
More protected from moral scrutiny is state terrorism. Israeli reprisal
raids are often a case of counter-terrorism, equally insensitive to the lives
of innocent civilians and often far more destructive. Israel’s use of
anti-personnel cluster bombs in its 1982 invasion of Lebanon was a
particularly brutal response to Palestinian pinpricks.6 The United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 Thomas C. Schelling, Arnu and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) 26–27.
6 Benjamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the Wed Can Win (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux,
1986). Israeli Ambassador Netanyahu offers a defense of state-sponsored terrorism, especially
Israeli state terrorism.
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also reportedly used cluster bombs in its attack on Benghazi, Libya, in
April 1986. President Reagan had previously asserted that he would have
no truck with killers of children. Yet American bombs dropped from the
air kill children as readily as terrorist bombs left at an airport. State
terrorism has also been committed by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan,
Whole villages have sometimes been wiped out in retaliation against the
Afghan mujaheddin.
Apart from direct state terrorism, there is state-supported terrorism
by private movements. Both Libya and the United States subsidize
movements of violence that often resort to terrorist methods. The U.S.
Congress has voted funds in support of the contras fighting against the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua and Jonas Savimbi’s United Front for the
Liberation of Angola (UNITA). Neither the contras nor UNITA are
morally fastidious about their methods of struggle: contras place bombs in
civilian buses, and UNITA places mines near villages, decimating life and
limb indiscriminately. Libya has subsidized movements of violence rang-
ing from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to radical Palestinians and
from Basque separatists in Spain to dissident movements in some black
African countries. In supporting rebel movements within the Western
world itself (like the IRA and the Basques), Libya has helped to remind
the West of a version of the Christian Golden Rule: ‘Do not do unto others
what you would not that they do unto you !‘
The fourth category of terrorism (after non–state-supported terror-
ism, state terrorism, and state-supported terrorism) is state-tolerated
terrorism. The United States has been quite lenient to members of the
IRA on the run from British justice on charges of terrorist murder and
other atrocities. Until 1986 it was extremely difficult for Britain to have
IRA suspects extradited from the United States. Both U.S. judges and the
Irish lobby on Capitol Hill continue to favor this particular class of
“terrorists” as candidates for asylum. The Republic of Ireland has faced a
major dilemma about what to do with the Provisional IRA. Most often
Dublin tolerates terrorists rather than hunting them down—although the
government has genuinely agonized over the dilemma. France has been a
haven of Basque separatists for a long time. From time to time Paris
makes an isolated gesture to Madrid by extraditing a Basque separatist
suspected of terrorism, but this is rare. Yet there is far less disapproval in
Washington of French “protection” of European “terrorists” than of its
provision of refuge for Middle Eastern ones. It is against this background
that the politics of international terrorism reveal such a profound moral
duplicity. Double standards are at work, and the superpowers together
with their respective allies are often at the heart of that duplicity.
Even more fundamental is the duplicity of nuclear ethics. The whole
ethos of the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was based
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on a principle of nuclear monopoly. Those who had the weapons were
insufficiently motivated to give them up; those who did not have them
were to be systematically discouraged from acquiring them. A nuclear
caste system was thus sanctified, a division of the world between nuclear
Brahmins and nuclear Untouchables. A kind of technological imperialism
was in the making. Nuclear military technology is still regarded as
something not safe or good for Africans, Asians, or children under
sixteen. More sophisticated defenders of the doctrine of the nuclear
deterrent have argued that we as human societies have a right to take
risks, even nuclear risks. But risks on whose behalf? Does country x have
a right to risk the survival of countries i% B, c, and D? Does either the
United States or the Soviet Union have a right to risk the lives of Indians,
Nigerians, Mexicans, or the Swiss? Does anyone have a right to risk the
survival of the human species itself?
In the absence of a global referendum on nuclear weapons, there
may be a case for extending the nuclear franchise itself, for breaking the
nuclear monopoly. The extension of the nuclear franchise will require
deliberate nuclear proliferation, upward nuclear mobility for the global
Untouchables and expansion of the ranks of nuclear Brahmins. One
purpose of nuclear proliferation horizontally is simply to alarm the
superpowers into recognizing that the nuclear world is getting too
dangerous and to encourage them to take speedy action toward universal
nuclear disarmament.
Of course horizontal nuclear proliferation has its risks, but are those
risks really more dangerous than the risks of vertical proliferation in the
arsenals of the superpowers themselves? Moreover, the underlying ethical
priorities are different. The Soviet Union and the United States are
risking human survival for the sake of national freedom. Would it not
make better moral sense to risk national freedom for the sake of the
survival of the human race? We are beginning to be alarmed by accidents
in civilian uses of nuclear energy, like the April 1986 Chernobyl disaster
in the Soviet Union and, even earlier, the Three Mile Island mishap in the
United States. Perhaps we need also to be alarmed into constructive action
by the specter of horizontal nuclear proliferation in the Third World.
Perhaps until now the major powers have worried only about “the wrong
weapons in the right hands,” deadly devices under the control of stable
hands. This has not been alarming enough to force the major powers into
genuine disarmament. When nuclear devices pass into Arab or black
African hands a new nightmare will have arrived—’’the wrong weapons in
the wrong hands,” deadly weapons controlled by unstable governments.
Perhaps that culture shock, that consternation, will at last create the
necessary political will among the major powers to move toward genuine
universal nuclear disarmament.
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Conclusion
One thing the Third World remembers very distinctly is that empires
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not last f&-ever. The lifespan of the founding father ‘of my own ~ountry
Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, testifies to that: when he was born, Kenya was not
yet a British crown colony; Jomo Kenyatta himself lived through the
colonial period, survived British rule by fifteen years, and ruled Kenya
himself for those fifteen years. Suppose that when the British first arrived
we East Africans had the nuclear bomb. Suppose we said: “Rather than be
colonized, we shall destroy the population of Kenya and of our neighbors
at th,e same time. ” Fortunately, we did not have a nuclear arsenal with
which to defend our freedom. Suppose the Soviet Union today conquered
the whole world. How long will such a vast empire last? “Backward”
Afghanistan alone has been keeping thousands of Soviet troops busy and
to some extent even scared since 1979. Even if we were all reduced to little
Afghanistans—or indeed to Polands—would that really be worse than a
nuclear winter? Asia and Africa know only too graphically that empires
do not last forever.
We live on an island in the infinite cosmos, an island called Earth. As
John Donne affirmed: “No man is an island entire unto itself. And
therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee.”
These words have acquired a supreme relevance in the nuclear age. No
one is an island—but everyone lives on one. There is no other island we
know in the cosmic sea; there are no two islands to justify the ethics of
dualism. In the face of our cosmic isolation, we must end the dualism and
concentrate on our human singularity. Even a liberal who asks “give me
liberty or give me death,” must surely realize that he or she cannot decide
for the rest of the human species. For liberals there must surely be one
imperative more important than liberty; for socialists one principle more
fundamental than economic justice. The two ethical worlds can have no
human meaning unless they jointly agree on one thing—that the survival
of the human species is a precondition for both liberty and economic
justice.
